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ABSTRACT 
The paper develops  a model in  which targeting  of the nominal  interest 
rate is a reasonable  guide for monetary policy.  Expected  real interest rates 
and output  are exogenous  with respect to  monetary  variables,  and the central 
bank ends  up influencing  nominal  interest rates by altering  expected 
inflation,  In this  model  the monetary authority  can come arbitrarily  close 
in each  period  to its (time-varying)  target for the nominal  interest rate, 
even while holding  down the forecast variance  of the price  level.  The latter 
objective  pins down the extent of  monetary accommodation  to  shifts in  the 
demand for money  and other  shocks, and thereby makes determinate  the levels 
of  money  and prices  at each  date.  Empirical  evidence  for the  tlnited States 
in the post-World  War II period  suggests that the model's predictions  accord 
reasonably  well with  observed  behavior for nominal  interest rates, growth 
rates of the monetary  base,  and rates of inflation.  Earlier  periods, 
especially  before  World  War  I,  provide an  interesting  contrast because 
interest-rate  smoothing  did not apply.  The behavior of the monetary base and 
the price  level  at these times  differed from  the post-World  War II experience 
in ways predicted  by the theory. 
Robert J. Barro 
Harvard University 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 Central bankers,  including  those at the Federal Reserve,  seem  to talk 
mainly  in terms  of controlling  or  targeting  interest rates.  Given  the 
pervasiveness  of this outlook,  it would probably be  useful for economists  to 
assign  interest rates a major role in a positive theory  of monetary  policy. 
Nevertheless,  many monetary  theorists—especially  those of an 'equilibrium' 
persuasion  (and sometimes  called 'monetarists")—have  viewed monetary  policy 
mainly  in terms of the behavior of monetary aggregates.  In this  view  the 
targeting  of interest  rates is either  impossible or undesirable  (see, for 
example, Friedman,  1968, and Brunner,  1968).  One aspect  of modern  versions 
of this skepticism  concerns price-level  determinism under  an interest-rate 
rule (see Sargent and Wallace,  1975, and McCallum,  1981).  A major  result 
here is  that an interest-rate  target  requires some  additional  mechanism  to 
pin down  the levels of  nominal variables.  However, this  observation  does not 
distinguish an interest-rate  rule from rules related  to  monetary growth  or 
inflation, which may also  be incomplete  with respect  to the levels of money 
and prices.  In  any event,  since any of these rules can be  extended  to 
achieve price-level  determinism,  this criticism does  not constitute  a serious 
attack on the logic or desirability  of this class of  policies. 
Part  of the difficulty  in thinking of monetary policy  in terms of 
interest  rates concerns  the familiar  distinction  between real  and nominal 
rates.  It  may be that systematically  and significantly  influencing  expected 
real interest rates—which is  what many  macroeconornists imagine when  they 
view  monetary  policy  in terms  of interest rates—is beyond  the power  of 
monetary  authorities  over  periods  of interesting  length.  In  fact,  my 
assumption  throughout  this paper  is that expected  real  interest rates  are 
exogenous  with  respect  to  monetary  policy.  But even with  this  extreme 
assumption  about  real  rates, the nominal  interest rate is a perfectly  fine nominal variable  that the monetary authority ought  to be able to control—at 
least  if  it does not try simultaneously  to regulate some  other nominal rate 
of change, such  as the inflation rate, the growth  rate of a monetary 
aggregate.  or the rate  of change of  the exchange rate.  Moreover,  since 
interest rates can be observed  rapidly and with  great accuracy,  they are good 
candidates  for variables  that the monetary authority  could monitor and react 
to in a feedback  manner.  In this  respect, feedback  from nominal  interest 
rates to monetary  instruments  seems more  attractive  than some  alternative 
suggestions  that involve the inflation rate or the growth  rate of nominal 
GNP. 
In this paper I explore the behavior of monetary  policy  that  is 
consistent  with  an  objective  of interest-rate smoothing. 
I  argue that  such 
an objective  appears  reasonable,  and leads  in a theoretical  model to  well- 
defined behavior  for the monetary base  and the price  level.  Furthermore, 
this behavior  for money and prices  provides testable hypotheses  about these 
variables  under a regime  where the monetary authority  targets nominal 
interest  rates.  The empirical  results suggest that this  regime  is a good 
approximation  to reality  in the United States  in the post-World  War II 
period, and perhaps also in the interwar period.  The sample  before  World War 
I reveals very  different  behavior  for the nominal  interest rate,  and 
therefore  provides  an interesting  contrast to  the recent  experience. 
Part I sets  out the theoretical  model.  Part II considers  optimal 
monetary policy  within  this  model.  Part  III views this  optimal  policy  as a 
positive theory  to derive  hypotheses about  the behavior  of the nominal 
interest  rate, the growth rate  of  the monetary  base,  and the inflation rate. 
Part IV  extends  the analysis  to incorporate  seasonal  elements.  Then  Part  V 
relates the theory  to  empirical  evidence  for the United  States  since  1890. I.  The Basic Theoretical yodel 
I use a simple  stochastic  model  of money supply and demand, which  builds 
on models  of Goodfriend  (1987), 4cCallum  (1986), and Hetzel  (1987).  The 
private economy  is described  by  two equations,  the first pertaining  to 
interest-rate  determination,  and the second to the real demand  for money: 






(2)  m- 
where  the variables  are 
nominal interest rate, 
log of price  level, 
Etpt+i:  expectation of next  period's  log of  price  level,  based on 
information  available  at date  t, 
m:  log of quantity  of money  (measured empirically  as  the monetary 
base), 
r:  permanent  part  of the expected real interest rate, 
Vt:  temporary shock  to  the expected real interest  rate, distributed 
independently  as  white  noise,  (mean 0, variance 
a:  permanent  part  of level of real demand  for money, 
t:  temporary  shock  to  real demand  for money,  distributed 
independently  as  white  noise,  (0, o), 
jJ  > 0:  coefficient  of the nominal  interest rate  in the money-demand 
function. 
The permanent  components  of the expected  real interest  rate and money  demand 
follow random  walks, rt 
= ri 




are distributed  independently as  white noise,  (mean 0, 
variances  and ,  respectively).  If the expected  real interest rate is 
stationary,  then  = 0. 
Equation  (I)  says that the expected real  interest rate,  rt 
+ v, is the 
sum of a random-walk and a  white-noise  component.  The main restriction  in 
this specification  is that movements  in the expected real rate are 
independent  of monetary  disturbances;  that is, of shifts  in the demand  for 
money.  at 
and  or in  the supply of nominal money.  It is straightforward 
to  allow  for nonzero  covariances  between the shocks to  the expected real 
interest  rate and the shocks to  money  demand.  However,  it is more important 
that  'monetary  policy'  cannot affect the expected  real interest rate  in this 
model. 
The specification  of  money demand  in equation  (2)  is similar  in spirit. 
The shifts to  money demand, at and  include effects from  changes  in output 
(permanent  and transitory,  respectively).  But these changes—and other 
shifts to the level of the money-demand  function—are  treated  as independent 
of the behavior  of the nominal money stock,  However,  monetary policy  can 
influence the nominal  interest rate, Rt, and thereby affect  the quantity of 
real  money  demaded) The particular  functional  form, with  the constant 
semi-elasticity  -fi,  is  solely  for analytical  convenience. 
There  are, of course, models in  which  monetary  shocks can affect  the 
expected  real interest rate  and output.  In  equilibrium-style  frameworks 
(such as  Lucas,  1972, 1973, and Barro,  1976, 1980), the real  effects  of money 
depend  on incomplete  information  about monetary  aggregates  and price  levels. 5 
Since  the gaps in information may be  small and short lived, the quantitative 
significance  of these effects has often been questioned  on a priori  grounds. 
Even  when the information  lags are important, the direction of effect of 
money  on the real variables  is ambiguous  (Barro and King,  1984). In  any case, 
the empirical  evidence  (Barro, 1981a) suggests  that the impact of monetary 
shocks  on expected  real interest rates  is small. 
Other models  where money has real  effects  involve the influence  of 
expected  inflation  on  transaction  costs and the quantity of real cash 
balances.  However,  these channels  are usually viewed as quantitatively 
unimportant.  Finally, money may influence the expected real interest  rate 
and output  in models with  sticky  prices, although  convincing  theoretical 
accounts of stickiness  that  matters  for real allocations are still  absent. 
Overall,  I  treat the expected  real interest rate and output  as exogenous 
with respect to  money  because I lack an  alternative  specification  that I 
regard as theoretically  or empirically  superior.  However, even if this 
assumption  is wrong,  it may still be satisfactory  in the present  context  if 
money  matters mostly  for nominal variables—such  as the price  level and the 
nominal  interest  rate—and only secondarily for real variables. 
The monetary  authority controls  the quantity of  nominal money (the 
monetary  base), 
iii,  in each  period.  Civen the assumed dichotomy  between 
money  and real variables,  it is difficult  to  motivate a meaningful  objective 
for the monetary  authority.  For example,  any concern  about output  and 
expected  real interest rates would  not matter for the choice of monetary 
policy.  I assume  that the monetary  authority  cares  about two things:  first, 
the departure  of the nominal  interest rate, R,  from  a target  value, R; and 
second, the spread  between the price  level, p,  and people's prior 
expectation,  Eip. 
In particular,  I assume  (as detailed  below) that  the 6 
authority  wants to hold  down  the magnitudes  of  the two gaps,  Rt 
-  and 
Pt 
-  E61p 
.  Fundamentally.  these concerns  must reflect some  real 
consequences  from  the two types of gaps, which  implies that monetary  policy 
is not fully neutral.  My basic assumption  is that these non-neutralities  are 
important  enough to motivate  an interest in monetary policy,  but.  not 
important  enough to generate  significant  effects on  the time  pattern of 
expected real interest rates and outputs.  In  particular.  the real effects 
can be neglected for the purpose of using equations  (1) and (2)  to  determine 
the time  path  of the price  level and the nominal  interest rate. 
It turns out in this model  that the monetary authority  can keep the 
nominal  interest rate, R, close  to its target, k, in  each  period. 
Therefore,  if  were  constant,  the model would  predict little  variation  in 
nominal  interest rates.  But  it  is well known that,  especially  in  recent 
years,  nominal  interest rates move  around a good deal  and in a largely 
unpredictable  manner.  In  fact, even  for short-term  rates, a random  walk is a 
pretty good  description  of  the recent data.  In  order to accord  with this 
observation,  the model  incorporates a time-varying  target  for the nominal 
interest rate  that  follows a  random  walk, 
(4)  =  + 
ut, 
where  u  is an independent,  white-noise  process with moments,  (0, u). 
The subsequent  results would  change  little  if equation  (4) were  modified 
to  = p-1 
+ u, 
where  p  is close to but below unity.  The interest-rate 
target  would  then  have  a long-run tendency  to  revert to a stationary  mean. 
But this  change  would matter  little for the high-frequency  properties  of the 
nominal  interest rate,  monetary  growth, and inflation,  which are the main concerns of this  study.  In  addition,  it would be straightforward  to allow 
for nonzero covariances  between u 
and the other disturbance  terms. 
One motivation  for equation  (4)  is that the nominal  interest rate is the 
tax rate on  money,  and the government  sets this tax rate  as  part of an 
overall problem  of optimal public finance.  The desire  to smooth  taxes 
intertemporally,  as  stressed  in Barro (1979) and Mankiw  (1987), tends also  to 
motivate  smoothness  in individual components  of the tax package, such  as the 
tax rate  on money.  In this context smoothness  means  that the government 
avoids  predictable  movements up and down  of the tax rates.  Consequently,  tax 
rates—here the target  nominal interest rate, Lt_would 
follow  a Martingale 
process, as implied by  the random-walk  model  in equation  (4). 
Many  economists  are understandably  skeptical  that this  optimal-tax 
argument  is a major  element in the conduct of monetary  policy in  the United 
States  or many other countries.  However, for subsequent  purposes,  the only 
significant  consideration  is that policy  involve an  interest-rate  target, , 
that  shifts  unpredictably  over time.  This  behavior  could likely  be  motivated 
by models  of monetary  policy  that have nothing to do  with fiscal  concerns. 
Because  of the lower bound of zero on the nominal  interest rate,  equation 
(4) cannot  apply universally.  However,  a random  walk  may be a satisfactory 
approximation  for a broad  range of  nominal  interest rates, even if not for 
samples  (such as that for the 1940s and early  1950s in  the United  States) 
where  the rates get close to  zero. 
I assume  that  the monetary authority  and the private  agents have 
symmetric  information,  with  each  observing m, Rt, and  during  period  t. 
In  contrast,  observations  on the price  level arise with  a lag (say 1  to 2 
months  for accurate  indices).  I model  this information  lag by assuming  that data  on  become available  during period t. Therefore,  the iag in 
obtaining  data  on the  general  price level essentially  defines the length of 
the period  in the model.  This setup accords with the notion  that interest 
rates are observable  more  rapidly  (and with greater accuracy)  than  are price 
indices.  Also,  the approach embodies the idea that the lag in publishing 
figures on  the money stock  (say the monetary base)  is short enough  to 
neglect . 
A  number  of economists  (such as Brunner, Cukierman,  and Meitzer,  1980) 
stress  that the monetary  authority cannot  readily distinguish  permanent 
shifts  to money demand from  temporary  shifts.  I model this  problem  by 
assuming that information  about the permanent  shock arrives  with a one-period 
lag; that is,  is known  at date t.  More realistically,  the o's would 
never  be observed  directly,  and estimates  of ai  (formed at date  t) would 
utilize  the observed  time  series of real cash balances, mtt 
- 
-  t-2' etc.  The inclusion of  in date  t's  information  set is a 
tractable  approximation  to this  specification.  Similarly,  I assume  that 
people  observe the permanent  component of the expected  real interest  rate 
with  a one-period  lag; that is, rti 
is  known at date  t. 
Given this informational  setup,  the monetary  authority's  optimal  choice 
of  can be expressed  as a function of  the state of  the economy at date t. 
Because  the model  is linear  and the monetary authority's  objective  is assumed 
(below) to be quadratic,  the optimal rule  would be a linear function  of the 
state of the economy.  In particular, monetary  growth  can be written  in the 
form 
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The coefficients  A will  be  determined  by the policymaker's  optimization 
problem. 
Many macroeconomic  models  can be  thought of in terms of  the sign of 
starting from  =  and  for given k, 
if 
Rt rises do you print more  money 
(A 
>  0)  or less money  (A1 
K  0) to get R  back  down  to target?  The condition 
A1 > 0 (which  central bankers know is right, and which  in fact applies  in 
this model)  tends to  arise  in Keynesian models  where monetary  expansion  has 
an inverse effect  on the expected real interest rate.  But,  in  the present 
model, the expected  real  interest rate is exogenous.  Therefore,  a positive 
response of nt-mt1 to an increase in R  (A1 
> 0) can work  to reduce 
Rt 
in 
this model only if expected  inflation, Ep+i-p, declines.  This reduction 
in expected  inflation  tends to occur  if expected future  monetary  growth, 
Etmt+imt, 
falls.  In other words,  an increase in  must  create  a tendency 
for some  of today's  infusion of money to be  taken  back in the future; for 
example,  in the next period.  This effect  follows from  the term, A3Ri 
in 
equation  (5), if A3  < 0.  In  fact,  it is the negative  value of 
A3, 
and not 
the value  of  A1, that matters  for interest-rate targeting.  The value of A1 
is irrelevant  in this  context because  it turns out to  affect  equally the 
levels of money  (and prices) for periods t and t+1.  However,  the choice  of 
A1 matters  if the monetary  authority  cares  not only  about  targeting  nominal 
interest  rates,  but also—as  I  assume—about the predictability  of the price 
level.  This last consideration  will  pin down  the desired response  of today's 
money to today's  interest rate,  which then determines  the value  of  A1, and 
thereby makes  determinate  the levels  of money and prices  at each date.  For 
this reason,  the problem  of price-level  indeterminism  (as discussed  in 
Sargent and Wallace,  1975; and McCallunm, 1981) will  not arise here. 10 
The linear model  described  by equations  (1)- (5)  can be solved  (after a 
lot of  algebra)  in the usual  way by the method  of  undetermined  coefficients 
(see Lucas,  1973, Barro,  1976, McCallurn,  1983,  1986, and 6oodfriend.  1987). 
The main complication  is that the expected  price level,  in equation 
(1),  depends on  the expectations, Ea  and 
Etwt.  That is, lacking full 
current information  about  this period's permanent  shocks  to money  demand  and 
the expected  real interest rate_at  and w_people 
form  expectations 
conditioned  on limited current  information.  This information  is conveyed by 
observing  today's nominal  interest rate, R. 
and money  stock, mt.  (Recall 
that Pt iS not  observable  at date t.) 
In any event,  the result from this exercise  is an equilibrium 
solution for R, Pt 
and mt as linear  functions of  current  shocks, 
(ar,  w, v, ut), and lagged variables.Z  The results  involve the 
8 \-coefficients  that  characterize  monetary policy in  equation  (5). 
II.  onetary Policy 
Given  the equilibrium  solution described  in Section  I, the monetary 
authority  chooses  its policy coefficients,  Ar,,..  'r' to  minimize  the 
expression, 
(6)  A.E(R 
- )2 + B.E(p 
- Eip)2 
where  A and B are positive  constants.  The objective  penalizes  interest-rate 
gaps  and price-level  surprises  in the typical future period,  which  is well 
defined  because the two expectations  of squared gaps in  expression  (6)  end up 11 
being the same  for all dates  t.  (The results would  not change  if the 
objective  involved an expected present value of the terms  shown in 
equation  (6).) 
Instead of examining  the solution to the model for arbitrary  choices of 
the A-coefficients,  I begin  with the optimizing  conditions  that are 
intuitive,  and then use these  restrictions to collapse  the equilibrium 
solution to a manageable  form.  Recall  that equation  (5)  is 
mt 
-  m1 







The policymakers optimization  implies the following  conditions: 






=  1—in  the long run, a higher  value  of nominal 
interest rates and nominal-interest-rate  targets must, for a given expected 
real rate, correspond  one-to-one  to a higher monetary  growth rate (if not, 
the term,  E(Rt 
- )2  is unbounded  as t —>  ). 
2)  A7 
= -1—given  the long-term behavior of nominal  interest rates, an 
increase in  the permanent  component of the expected  real rate  implies a 
one-  to one reduction  of the inflation rate, and hence,  of the monetary growth 
rate  (again needed to keep  E(Rt 
- 
bounded). 
3)  A0 
= O—without  sustained  real growth, monetary  growth  corresponds  in 
the long  run to the inflation  rate, and hence to the difference  between the 
nominal  and expected  real interest rates; more  generally,  A0 equals  the 
long-term growth  rate of  real money demanded  (this condition  keeps  down 
E(Rt 
-  with  no implications  for Pt 
- Eip). 
4)  A5  -A6 
=  1—the first part,  A5 
= 
-A6,  is  necessary  to keep 
E(R 
- k)2  bounded as t —>  the second  part says that permanent  shifts  to 
money  demand, at 
=  - 
°t-2' are fully accommodated  once they  are L2 
recognized  as  permanent.  This response holds down  E(p 
-  Ef  ipt) without 
affecting  itt 
- 




- )  + 3(Rti  Rti) 
+ Rtl 
+ l 
+  - 
+ ai 
- 
The  next optimizing  condition  is 
5)  +  = -fl---a (permanent)  shift  in the target, u 
=  -  (and 
hence,  in actual  nominal  interest rates, which are being  targeted),  depresses 
real  money demanded  by the amount -.  The  reduction  in monetary  growth by 
this  amount avoids  a price  level response and, therefore,  holds down 
E(pt 
- Eip) (without affecting  R, 
- 
Re). 
Given conditions  (1)—(5), the monetary growth  rate is given  by 
(7)  m 
-  mt-i 
= t(Rt 






This form  highlights  the role of the coefficients  A1 
and  which describe 
monetary  reactions  to  current  and lagged interest-rate  gaps.  Corresponding 
to equation  (7), the models  equilibrium  solution can be used  to derive  the 
following  results: 
-  (t÷at÷\t÷wt) 
(8)  R  -  = 
(1-A3+) 13 
—  (Pt÷at)(1-Ai_A3)  (vt+w)(Ai÷3) 
(9)  t 





Since the economy cannot distinguish  in the current period  between  temporary 
and permanent  shocks, the two money-demand  disturbances  enter  as  the sum, 
+ at, 
and the two real-interest-rate  disturbances  enter as the sum,  + w. 
In the absence of a  monetary  response, a positive  shock to  money  demand, 
+ at, 
lowers Pt 
-  Et1P.  To the extent  that the economy views  the shock 
as temporary, Ep+j 
- 
Pt 
rises  (that  is,  the temporary  disturbance  would not 
affect Etp+i), so that  Rt 





-  offsets the tendency of 
- Eip 
to  fall in equation  (9).  If 
A3 < 0,  the negative  reaction of m+i 
- 






in equation  (8). 
A positive  shock to the expected  real interest rate, v 
+ w, 
raises 
-  k.  directly  in  equation  (8).  The reaction of monetary  growth, A1, and 
the reduction  in  money demand, ,  lead  to  increases  in Pt 
-  Etipt in 
equation  (9).  To the extent  that mt+i 
- m declines  (with A3 
< 0),  the 
response of R 
-  to  vt 
+ w gets smaller in  equation  (8). 
Define  the overall  variance of  money-demand  and real-interest-rate 
shocks as 
(10) 
The results  in equations  (8)  and (9) imply that  the terms appearing  in the 
policymaker's  objective  in equation  (6)  are given  by 2 
(11)  E(R  2  = 
(  -A3+ 
)2  (r2+r2)(+Th2 
(12) 
-  E1p)2 
=  + 
Note that  E(Rt 
-  in  equation  (10)  is independent  of . (The 
contemporaneous  reaction, A, of  money to the interest  rate affects  the 
levels of  money and prices, but not the rates of change  that matter  for the 
nominal  interest rate)  Hence, )  can be chosen  to  minimize E(p 
- 
Et1pt)2 
for a given  value of  In particular,  the solution  for  as a function of 
does not depend  on the weights,  A and B,  in  expression  (6).  The resulting 





Oiven this choice  for  as a  function  of A, E(pt 
-  Etp)2 in equation 
(12) becomes 
(22)  (2+2)  2  ia  vw 




which  is independent  of 
A3. 
As long as the current and prospective  reactions 
of money to interest-rate  gaps, A  and A3, maintain  the correct relationship 
—dictated by equation  (13)—the overall  level of the reaction  does not 
matter  for the determination  of p.  Therefore,  A3 
can now be chosen 15 
(independently  of the weights A and B in expression  (6)) to minimize 
E(R 
-  It follows  immediately from  equation  (11) that the best choice 
is  Equation  (13) then  implies A 
— ,  but  the ratio,  A1/A3,  remains 
finite  and is given  by 
-  A1  (+o) 
(lo)  x=-  q2 
—that  is, as  the ratio of  money-demand  variance to the sum of money-demand 
and expected-real-interest-rate  variance.  Hence 0 
1A1/A31 ￿ 1—the current 
reaction  of money to the nominal  interest rate is smaller in  magnitude  and 
opposite  in sign  to  the prospective  reaction.  However,  in  the limit, each 
reaction become  infinite in  order to keep  the nominal interest  rate, R, 
arbitrarily  close  to its target, ,  in each  period. 
Using the form  of  the monetary rule  from  equation  (7) and the optimal 
choices for 
A1 and A3, the equilibrium  solutions for R, t' and mt turn  out 
to be 
(16)  Rt 
=  =  ÷ 
ut 





+  +  wt) 
+ (1  + 
-  + v1) 
-  - ri 22  r +r 
(18)  mt 
= mti 
+  _!L_.  (p 
+ at  + v 
+ w) 




Equation  (18) shows that monetary growth partially  accommodates  the 
current  shocks to money  demand  and the expected  real interest rate, 
that is, the coefficient  is ( 
+ 2)/2  (where 2  is the total 
variance).  The result  says that contemporaneous  monetary accommodation  is 
greater the larger the variance of money demand ( 
+  relative to that  of 
the expected  real interest rate ( 
+ c).  Interpreting  +  as the 
variance of the L(  curve and  +  as  the variance of the IS curve, the 
results are reminiscent  of  those found by  Poole  (1970).  However,  in  the 
present model, the tradeoff  is not between targeting  nominal interest  rates 
and targeting  monetary  aggregates.  The targeting of the nominal  interest 
rate is complete  here independently of the variances  of money demand  and the 
expected  interest rate (that is, of the relative volatility  of the LM and IS 
curves).  In the present model,  the tradeoff  that determines  the extent  of 
current accommodation  comes,  in equation  (17), from  the negative  response of 
Pt to the money-demand  shock, i 
+ a and the positive response  to the 
real-interest-rate  shock, v 
+ w.  (The former reflects  the negative  effect 
on prices  from  an increase  in money  demand  less the positive effect  from the 
monetary  response.  The latter reflects only  the monetary reaction.)  The 
extent of monetary  accommodation  is the one that makes the overall  variance 
of 
Pt 
from these two sources of  disturbances  as small as  possible. 
With a one-period  lag, monetary  growth  exhibits an inverse, one-to-one 
reaction  to the temporary  shocks  + v1 
in equation  (18)).  This 
response  generates  the reduction  in expected  inflation  that allows  the 17 
monetary authority  to offset au  incipient excess of  over  In 
particular,  although the temporary  shock,  + v, induces an increase  iii 
today's monetary growth,  it also  generates  a reversal pattern where  next 
period's monetary growth  falls  by more  than todays increase. 
A permanent  shock to  money demand,  at 
=  -  is accommodated 
partially  (since it cannot be  disentangled  from  a temporary  shock), but there 
is no adjustment  of  monetary growth  at date t +  1  when  the value  of 
at is 
revealed.  Hence the reversal pattern for monetary growth  does  not arise for 
permanent  shifts to  money  demand.  (If at were  observable  at date  t, money 
growth  would  react one-to-one  immediately, and subsequent  growth  rates  of 
money  would be unchanged.) 
Finally,  a shock to  the interest-rate  target, ut 
=  -  Rti_hich1 I 
assume  is  observable  at date t—affects monetary growth  by the amount  -/3,  and 
thereby  leaves p  unchanged.  (If any of the other disturbances—17,  at, Vt, 
w_were  observable, the policymaker  could similarly  insulate the price level 
from  these  shocks.) 
One of the prime  sources of shifts to money demand,  + 
at, would  be 
movements  in  output.  The results  in equations  (17) and (18) imply  (for a 
given  expected  real  interest rate)  that these exogenous  shifts  in output 
would  be  contemporaneously  negatively  correlated  with  the price  level and 
contemporaneously  positively  correlated  with the money  supply.  Thus the 
results  are consistent  with  Fair's  (1979) findings about  the relation  between 
shocks  to output  and prices  for the United  States  in the post-World  War II 
period.  Also,  the results accord with  many analyses that  report  a positive 
correlation  between  money and output, although  the relation  in this model 
reflects  only  the endogenous  response  of the money  supply  (which has been 18 
stressed by King  and Plosser,  1984).  On  the other hand,  lagged output  (that 
is,  t-1) would  be  negatively  correlated  with current money  (and prices). 
This  result  means that  monetary  growth would exhibit a countercyclical 
reaction  to  lagged  output.  This  type of relation has been  found  for Ml 
growth  in the post-World  War II United States  in Barro (1981b). 
III.  Ip1ications  of the Theory  for  onetary-Base Growth  and Inflation 
Let ARt 
=  -- 
=  (the growth  rate of the monetary  base), 
and  =  (the  inflation rate).  Equation  (16)  implies thatAR 
is 
white noise.  (If L 
were  not a  random walk, but instead had a mean-reverting 
tendency  in the long run, then the process for R  would change  accordingly.) 
Equations  (17)  and (18) prescribe  the patterns  for Ap  and  that  are 
consistent  with  this process for  These predictions  about inflation  and 
monetary-base  growth  are the principal  empirical content of the theory. 
Taking first differences  of  equation  (18) leads to 
(19)  = Amti 
+ []( 
+ at 
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where Et  is a composite error term and et is a white-noise disturbance.  In 
other words, the model  implies  that  Am is an ARIMA (0,1,2) process. 
Furthermore,  the theory  imposes restrictions  on the coefficients  of this 19 
process.  The unitary coefficient  on  reflects  the nonstationarity  in 
monetary  growth  that is induced by  the nonstationarity  of the 
nominal-interest-rate  target  in equation  (4) (and also by  any nonstationarity 
of the expected  real interest rate  in  equation  (3)). 
The two MA coefficients must satisfy the conditions, 
2  22  2  22 
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(21)  a2re 
= 
COV(E, E2) 
=  '7 
q2 
'7  ￿  0 
where  is the variance  of e.  Hence, a1 ￿  0 and 
a2 ￿  0.  Moreover,  the 
magnitude  of 
a1 
is much  greater than that of a2—one  inequality  that holds is 
Ia1F ￿  4a2/(l+a2),  or equivalently,  a2 ￿  a11/(4 
- 
1a1[).  As  and 
become  small, the solution approaches  stationarity  for  and 
rt, and hence 
for monetary growth  and inflation.  In particular,  as  and o  approach 
zero,  the solution  tends toward 
a1+a2 
= -1. 
The equation  for the inflation rate  comes  from  first  differencing  of 
equation  (17).  After  substituting  for mt  on the right  side (using 
equation  (18)) and simplifying,  the results are 20 
22  22 
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where  Ft is a composite  error term  and  is a white-noise  disturbance  (which 
is not generally  independent of 
et). 
As before, Apt 
is an  ARIMA  (0,1,2) 
process;  the unitary coefficient on Aptl again reflects mainly  the 
nonstationarity  of the nominal-interest-rate  target.  The two MA coefficients 
satisfy 
2  22 
2  2  2 
(23)  b1(l+b2)f 
= 
COV(Ft,  Fri) 
=  + 
+ a]( 
+ 92) II 
22  +0 
(24)  b2 
= 
COY(F, Ff2) 
=  ￿ 
where  is the variance of  Hence,  b1 
0 and b2  0.  The magnitude  of 
b1  tends  to be much greater  than that  of  b2, with 
1b11  ? 4b2/(1 
+ b2) 
applying.  Again, o 
=  =  0  implies b1÷b2 
= -1. 
The precise  forms of the time-series  processes  for  and  depend  on 
the distributional  specifications  for the underlying  stochastic  shocks. 
Furthermore,  the results are sensitive to  discrepanies  between the period  in 
the theory  and that  in a data  set.  However, the general nature  of the 
results should  be  robust to  these problems.  Namely, first, monetary  growth 
and inflation have  a unit  root  if there  is a unit root in the nominal 
interest rate;  second, monetary growth  and inflation  each have a reversal 
pattern,  which  shows up  with a short  lag as a negative  and substantial 
moving-average  term;  and third, a weaker but positive  moving-average  term 
appears at a longer  lag. 
One other  result  involves a comparison  of  the variance of R 
given  from  equation  (16) as o—with  the one-period  variances  of monetary 
growth  and inflation.  Inspection of equation  (22) shows  that the variance  of 
- -l  involves o  plus  other  positive  terms —therefore, this  variance 
(VAR(Ft)) exceeds  that of 
Rt 
- Ri.  Similarly,  equation  (19) implies that 
the variance  of  - 
(VAR(Et)) exceeds o.  Hence the model  predicts 
that  inflation and monetary growth  are each more  volatile  than  the nominal 
interest  rate.  This result  seems to  conflict with the common view  that 
inflation  moves relatively  little  in  the short run.  However,  the prediction 
turns  out to accord  with  the  data. 22 
IV.  Seasonals 
So far, the model contains  no  systematic  seasonals.  but these are known 
to be important for money in the post-World War II period, and for nominal 
interest rates before  the founding of the Federal Reserve  (see, for example, 
Kemmerer,  1910, Ch. 2; Macaulay,  1938, Chart 20; Shilier,  1980, pp. 136-  137: 
Clark,  1986; Miron,  1986; and Mankiw, Miron and  Weil,  1986).  I consider 
briefly here the implications of systematic  seasonals  in money demand  and in 
the real  interest rate.  For simplicity,  I now neglect the various  stochastic 
terms considered  before.  Given the linearity of the model,  the new effects 
would be  additive  to  those from  the stochastic  terms. 
The model with  deterministic  seasonals and no  stochastic  shocks  is 
(25)  Rt 
= r +  -  + 
(26)  ni 




(27)  -  =  + 
where  Tt, S, 
and  are seasonal  factors, and Ep+i 
=  applies  in  this 
deterministic  model.  Suppose, as has been  argued  is true  of the Federal 
Reserve, that  the monetary  authority  sets  to  offset  the effects of Tt and 
St on the noninal  interest rate.  Then,  with R 
= PL,  equation  (25) implies 
- 
Pt 
=  -  r - 
Tt 23 
Using R 
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Substituting  into  this last  relation for 
pr,-  from above  (with a 
one-period  lag) and for mt-mti  from  equation  (27) yields  (after setting 




-  Stl 
This  seasonal  pattern for monetary growth  eliminates  the seasonal  in  the 
nominal  interest rate—that is, achieves Rt 
= L 
The implied relations  for monetary  growth and inflation  are 
(28)  = p 
- Ti 
+ S 
-  S1 
(29)  = p 
- Tti 
Note that,  if the seasonal  applied to  money demand  (St), but not to the real 
interest rate (Tt), then  the seasonal  in monetary  growth  would  eliminate  the 
seasonal  in inflation  along  with  that in the nominal  interest rate.  But,  if 
there is a seasonal  in the real  interest rate, then  a seasonal  in inflation 
remains. 
Since  the seasonals  in money demand  and the real interest  rate were 
assumed  to be  deterministic  and understood  by the monetary  authority,  the 
seasonal  in the nominal  interest rate  could  be  eliminated  by introducing a 
deterministic  seasonal  into monetary  growth.  More generally,  the seasonals 24 
in  money demand  and the real interest rate could  evolve stochastically,  and 
also  be  unknown to the monetary authority.  But, even in this  case, the 
policymaker  could  remove the seasonal  in the nominal interest rate  by 
pursuing  the type  of feedback  reaction to the nominal  interest rate that  was 
considered  before.  Hence,  if the elimination  of seasonals  in nominal 
interest rates  is deemed  to be desirable  (on public-finance  grounds?),  then 
the possibility of removing them in this way strengthens the case  for 
interest-rate targeting. 
V.  Epirical Findings 
The empirical  results  involve seasonally  unadjusted  data  since  1890 on 
nominal  interest rates  (4-  to  6-month prime commercial  paper9),  the monetary 
base (unadjusted  for changes  in reserve requirements),  the consumer price 
index  (CPI-IJ,  available  since  1913, except that  the index without  the shelter 
component  was used since 1970),  and the producer  price  index (PPI, all 
commodities).  All variables  are monthly but observed  at the quarterly 
intervals of  January,  April,  July, and October.  The identification  of the 
period  in the theory  with  quarters  is, of course, somewhat  arbitrary. 
(Recall that  the period  in the theory relates especially  to the flow  of 
information  about  the price  level.) 
The  underlying  data  are monthly  averages of daily figures  for interest 
rates  and the monetary  base (except that before  August 1917  the figures on 
the monetary  base  are at the end of each  month).  The price  indices are an 
average of  observations  during  each  month,  although for the CPI some of the 
components  are sampled  less frequently  than  once  per month.  The 3-month 
spacing between each  observation  should minimize  the problems  related to 25 
time-averaged  data.  That is, the formulation  approximates  point-in-time  data 
observed once  per quarter. 
Figures 1-4 depict  the four  time  series under  study.10  All variables  are 
measured  at annual rates.  Figure 1 shows the nominal  interest rate  at a 
quarterly  interval from 1860 to 1987.  The interest rate  displays  more high 
frequency  movement  before  1914 (when the Fed was established)  than 
afterwards.  As noted by  Macaulay  (1938, Chart 20), Shiller  (1980, pp. 
136-137), Miron (1986), Clark  (1986), and  Mankiw, Miron,  and Well (1986), 
among others, this  pattern turns  out to  reflect seasonals  and other temporary 
movements  in  the nominal  interest rate  that were much more  important  during 
the earlier period  than later on.  In  addition, the nominal  interest rate 
appears to be stationary  in the earlier sample and non-stationary  in the 
later one.  Note  also  that the graph  shows the extremely  low nominal  interest 
rates from  the mid 1930s to the early  1950s, which  includes the period  of 
explicitly  pegged Treasury  Bill  rates from  April  1942 to  mid 1947 (and with a 
moving  peg from  then  to the Fed-Treasury  Accord of March 1951 and its 
confirmation  by  the Fed in March  195311).  However,  it is  unclear from  the 
graph  whether this  pegging  involves a special policy  or  was  instead just  the 
consequence of the nominal  interest  rate coming  close  to  its lower bound of 
zero.  Probably  it is no  accident  that the period  of precise  pegging 
coincides  with  the time  of lowest  nominal  interest rates. 
Figure  2 shows the growth  rate  of the monetary  base  at a  quarterly 
interval from 1879 to 1987.  The growth  rate  for each quarter  is expressed  at 
an annual  rate.  For the entire  sample  period, the plot indicates a great 
deal  of high frequency  variation,  which turns  out to reflect  seasonals  and 
other  temporary  fluctuations.  Unlike  for the nominal  interest  rate,  it is 26 
less  clear visually what  sort of  break  in the monetary  process night  have 
occurred  around  1914. 
Figure 3 shows  the annualized  growth  rate of the consumer price  index at 
a quarterly  interval  from 1913 to 1987.  Similarly,  Figure 4 indicates the 
growth  rate of the producer price  index at a quarterly  interval from  1860  to 
1987.  The decreasing  volatility  of each series  over  time  probably  reflects, 
at least  in part, the increasing  coverage of  goods. 
Table  1 contains  regression  results for the recent  period, 1954.1 to 
1987.4.  Starting  in 1954 avoids  the extremely  low nominal  interest rates 
through  the early  1950s, for which the lower bound of zero  would  be 
significant  (so that nominal  interest rates could  not be  approximated  as a 
random  walk).  Also,  this sample excludes  any effects on measured  price 
indices from  the controls during  World War II  and the Korean  War. 
The basic  format of the empirical  results consists of estimated  equations 
for an ARMA representation  with  systematic  seasonals, 














is a white-noise  error  and Y  represents  R, 
or 
A(PPI)t. 
(It  is the commercial  paper  rate, AM is the growth  rate of the monetary  base, 
LP is the growth  rate  of the CPI, and A(PPI)  is the growth  rate of the 
producer price index.12)  The variable S1 
is a seasonal  dummy for the first 
quarter  (1 for January,  0 otherwise),  and similarly  for 
52t  (for April), S3 














= 0.  For  and 
the model under  interest-  rate  smoothing  suggests nonzero values  for 
q1, q2. q3, 
and 
q4. p = 1,  c1 < 0, and c2  0. with  c1 much greater than c2 
and c1 
+ c2  -1.  S{ore generally,  the theory  suggests that the 
moving-average  coefficients will  be  negative  and of substantial  magnitude 
over the near  term (such as c1,  and positive but of much smaller size later 
Aside from  the estimated  coefficients and (asymptotic) standard  errors, 
the table reports the following  statistics: 
Q(10i:  Box-Pierce  Qstatistic for serial  correlation of residuals 
with 10  lags, with  degrees  of freedom and asymptotic  significance  level 
(based on the  distribution)  shown  in parentheses. 
Seasortals:  likelihood-ratio  statistic  (equal to -2.log  of 
likelihood  ratio) for the equation with seasonals  against the null 
hypothesis  of the same equation except  for no  seasonality  (q1 
= q9 = 
q3 
= 
q4),  with  the asymptotic  significance  level  (based on the 
distribution  with 3 degrees of freedom)  shown in  parentheses. 
The random-walk  model, Rt 
=  +  constant  (where the constant could be 
set to zero  here),  is satisfactory  for the nominal  interest rate in the 
post-1954  period.  Notably,  Q(10)  from  line 1  of Table  1 has a  significance 
level of .18, while  the likelihood-ratio  statistic  for seasonals  has a 
significance  level of .6713  The unrestricted estimate  of  is .934, 
s.e. = .030.  The implied  "t—value" relative  to  unity  is 2.2, which  is below 
the  .10 critical  value  of 2.6 from  the Dickey-  Fuller  test (Fuller,  1976, 
Table 8.5.2, the section  for 
ri). 
Given the random-walk-like  behavior  of the nominal  interest rate, the theory's other predictions  should  apply to 
monetary-base growth  and inflation. 
The estimated equation  in the ARIMA (0,  1,  2) form  for the growth  rate  of 
the monetary base  appears  in line 4 of  the table.  The equation  exhibits 
strong seasonality,  with  a likelihood-ratio  statistic  of 109.  The 
q-statistic for serial  correlation of  residuals  is 9.2, which is significant 
at only  the  .33 level.  The estimated MA(l) coefficient  is highly 
significant, -  .79,  s.c. = .09,  and conforms  in sign and rough magnitude  with 
the model's predictions.  Corresponding  to an  MA(1)  value of  - .79,  the model 
implies 0  MA(2)  .25.  The estimated MA(2)  coefficient on line 4 is - .07, 
s.e. = .09,  which  is insignificantly  below zero,  but significantly  less 
than 25. 
Line  6 of the table  shows  that the inclusion of more  moving-average  terms 
leads to an estimated MA(4)  coefficient of .15, s.e. = .09.  Thus,  the 
results accord with  the prediction  that the moving-average  terms will be 
negative  and large  in magnitude  over  the near  term (lag 1), and positive hut 
small  in size later on (in this case at lag 4, but not at lags 2 or 3). 
Lines  5 and 7 show that freely  estimated coefficients  of tin1 (.990, se. = 
.098,  and .952, s.c. = .114,  respectively)  differ  insignificantly  from  one 
according  to the Dickey-Fuller  test.14 
The ARIMA  (0,  1, 2) form  for the CPI inflation  rate appears on line 9 of 
Table  1.  The seasonals  are again significant,  although  less  dramatically 
than  for the monetary  base.  The Q-statistic  is now significant  at the  .07 
level.  The estimated  (A(1) coefficient, 
- .66,  s.c. = .09, again  accords with 
the theory.  Corresponding  to  MA(l)  = - .66, the theory  predicts 
0 < MA(2)  <  .20, which  is consistent  with  the estimated  value for MA(2) of 29 
.09, se.  = .09.  The inclusion of more  moving-average  terms on line 11 leads 
to  MA(3)  = .26,  s.e. = .09.  Finally,  lines 10 and 12 show that  freely 
estimated  coefficients for Aptl are  insignificantly  different  from  one 
(.944, s.e. = .074,  and .870, s.e. = .088,  respectively). 
The underlying  theory  regarded the nominal interest rate  as  controllable 
by the monetary authority,  but treated the expected real interest rate  as 
exogenous  with  respect to  monetary  variables.  Hence monetary  policy  affected 
the nominal  interest rate  only  by influencing  the expected  rate  of inflation. 
Many economists  are skeptical  about this model because they  think of nominal 
interest rates  as highly  flexible and of actual and expected  inflation  rates 
as sticky  in the short  run.  The results  in Table 1 conflict with  this view 
in that the residual  standard deviation  for quarterly  CPI  inflation—2,47.  per 
year  on line 9—is about double  that of the nominal  interest rate—l.27.  per 
year  on line 1.  Similarly,  as the theory predicts,  the residual  standard 
deviation  for monetary  base growth—3.37.  per year  on line 4—exceeds that for 
the nominal  interest rate.15 
Table 2 shows comparable  results for the interwar period, 1922.1-  1940.4. 
There  is now some indication  of predictable  movements  in the nominal  interest 
rate.  For example,  in line 2 of the table,  the estimated  MA(l)  coefficient 
is .24, s.e. = .12,  and the  likelihood-ratio  statistic  for the seasonals  has 
a significance  level of .04.  However,  the seasonal  coefficients  are small  in 
magnitude.  The unrestricted  estimate  of  on line 3—.949,  s.e. = .029— 
again  differs  insignificantly  from  one.  Overall,  these  results for the 
interest  rate  turn  out to be a middle  ground  between those  shown  in Table  1 
for the post-1954  period  and those  examined below  for the pre-1914  period, 
which reveal  substantial  predictable  movements  in  the nominal  interest  rate. 30 
The ARIMA  (0,  1,  2)  process for monetary-base  growth, shown on line 5 of 
Table 2, again exhibits  pronounced  seasonality, although  the pattern differs 
from  that for the post-1954  period.  The MA(1)  coefficient  is substantially 
negative  (- .66,  s.e. = .12),  but the new element  is the significantly 
negative MA(2)  value  (- .28,  s.e. = .12).  Even  with  the inclusion of more 
moving-average  terms  (line 7), the results do not reveal the eventually 
positive  terms predicted  by  the theory.  However, the coefficients  of mt1 
(lines 6 and 8)  still differ  insignificantly  from  one. 
For CPl inflation, the ARIMA  (0,1,2) process on line  10 looks similar to 
that  estimated  for the post-1954 period.  There  is,  however,  no  appearance  of 
positive  MA  coefficients  at longer  lags (line 12).  The estimated 
coefficients  for _i  (lines  11 and 13) still differ  insignificantly  from 
one 
Table 3 shows results for the period  1890.1-  1913.4, which  applies to  the 
gold standard and precedes  the founding of  the Federal Reserve.  For this 
period  the nominal  interest rate may be  stationary  and a coefficient of zero 
for R1  is satisfactory  (lines 2 and 3 of the table).  However, the 
estimated  coefficient of Rtl 
on line 3—16, s.e. = .37—also  differs 
insignificantly  from  one according  to the .10 critical value  of the 
Dickey-Fuller  test.  There  is now substantial  short-run  predictability  of 
movements  in the nominal  interest rate;  in line 2 the likelihood-ratio 
statistic  for seasonality  has a significance  level of .001.  In addition,  the 
first three MA coefficients  are positive and significant  (.49, s.e. = .11; 
.22,  s.e. = .11;  and  .26,  s.e. = .11). 
Given the absence  of interest-rate smoothing,  the behavior of the 
monetary  base and the price  level before  1914 should differ  from that found 31 
in  the later periods.  The results suggest that the growth  rate of the 
monetary  base  before  1914 (which coincides  in this  period with  currency  in 
circulation)  is stationary,  and a coefficient  of zero  for  is 
satisfactory  (lines 5 and 6 of  Table  3).  (The estimated  coefficient  of mt1 
is - .21,  s.e. = .36,  which  differs six'ificantly  from  I  at  about the .01 
level according  to  the Dickey-Fuller  test.)  There are significant  seasonals 
in nonetary-  base  growth, as  shown on line 5 by the significance  level of .000 
for the likelihood-ratio  statistic.'6  However, this seasonal  in the nonetary 
base  did not eliminate  the seasonal  in the nominal  interest rate.  In fact. 
since  the United  States  was on  the gold standard,  the behavior  of the 
monetary  base (and the U.S. price  level) would  have  been largely constrained 
to be consistent  with  the world price  level,  including  its seasonal pattern 
if it had one.  Therefore,  it would  not generally  be  possible  under this type 
of monetary  system  to  choose  a seasonal  in the monetary base  that  removed the 
seasonal  in  the nominal interest rate. 
Aside  from the seasonals,  the results for the growth  rate of the monetary 
base  on line 5 indicate a positive (A(l)  coefficient,  .28,  s.e. = .11.  The 
simple  specification  that monetary-base  growth  is an  !i(A(1)  with seasonais 
appears  satisfactory  according  to the Q- statistic. 
Viewed  jointly, the results for the nominal  interest rate  and the 
monetary  base in Tables  1-3 are consistent  with the viewpoint  (expressed 
recently  by  Maukiw, Miron,  and Weil,  1986) that shifts  in monetary  policy 
after the founding  of the Federal Reserve  in 1914 were responsible  for the 
elimination  of  predictable  temporary  movements,  including seasonals,  in the 
nominal  interest rate.  The present analysis  identifies these  shifts in 
monetary  policy  with  specific  changes  in the process for monetary-base 32 
growth.  Namely, the growth rate  became  non-stationary,  a  substantially 
negative MA(l)  coefficient  appeared, and the seasonal patterns changed. 
Moreover, the results for the interwar period suggest  that  the Federal 
Reserve did not  get the  monetary  process  right immediately.  Only in  the 
post-1954 period  does all the short-term  predictability  of nominal  interest 
rate  movements  seem  to  disappear.  On  the other hand,  the results are 
consistent  with  the idea that the elimination of a serious gold standard— 
also  occurring  in 1914—was responsible  for the changed behavior  of  nominal 
interest  rates.  The elimination  of the gold  standard may have been  a 
prerequisite  for the implementation of a  monetary  policy that successfully 
targeted nominal  interest rates. 
Results for the PPI  inflation rate from 1890 to 1913 appear  on lines 7 
and 8 of Table 3.  This  inflation rate exhibits  significant  seasonality  and 
appears to be  stationary  (the estimated  coefficient of 5p1  on line  8 of 
Table 3 is .23, s.e. = .10,  which  is significantly  below  1).  The estimatcd 
MA  coefficients  are insignificant,  except for a negative MA(4)  (- .35,  s.c. = 
.11),  which might  reflect stochastic  variation  in seasonals.  The CPI is 
unavailable for this period, except  for rough  estimates on an  annual  basis. 
(For the later  samples, the time-series  parameters  estimated  for PPI 
inflation accord  in a rough way with  those for CPI inflation.) 
Concluding  Observations 
Theoretical  reasoning  suggests  that interest-rate  targeting  is a 
reasonable  guide for monetary  policy.  In a  model  where expected  real 
interest rates  and output  are exogenous with respect to monetary  variables, 
the central bank influences  nominal  interest rates by altering  expected  rates of inflation.  It turns out that the monetary authority  can come arbitrarily 
close to  meeting  its (time-varying)  target for the nominal  interest rate. 
even while  holding down  the forecast variance of the price  level.  The latter 
objective  pins down the extent  of accommodation  of the money supply to 
shifts  in the demand  for money.  The greater the variance  of shocks to  money 
demand  (i.e., of  the LI  curve)  relative to  that of the expected real interest 
rate (i.e., the IS  curve), the greater  the degree  of accommodation. 
Incipient  increases  in the nominal interest  rate (caused by shocks to 
money  demand or  the expected real  interest rate) lead in  the usual way to 
monetary  expansion—e.g..  to  open-market  purchases  of bonds.  This  response 
lowers expected  inflation because the influx of  money  is  temporary.  That is, 
the central hank  plans  to take  back  later some  of  today's  infusion of  money, 
and people's  expectations  of this behavior  lowers anticipated  growth  rates of 
money  and prices  Therefore,  the nominal  interest rate falls back  toward  its 
target  value  even though  the expected  real interest rate  does  not change. 
If the target  nominal  interest rate  moves as a random  walk,  the 
successful  targeting  by  the central bank  implies that the nominal  interest 
rate  also  follows  this pattern.  Given this  policy  of interest-rate 
targeting—and the assumed  specification  for money  demand  and the expected 
real  interest rate—the growth  rate  of  the monetary  base and the price  level 
must follow  ARIMA (0,1,2) processes.  The unit roots  in these  processes 
reflect mainly  the non-  stationarity  of  the nominal  interest rate.  The 
moving-average  terms  correspond  to  the responses  to  temporary  shocks—in 
particular,  the tendency  for infusions  of money  (in response  to incipient 
rises  in  the nominal  interest rate)  to be followed  by  removal of money  in the 
future. Empirical  evidence for the United States  since  1890 accords  in the main 
with the theoretical  propositions.  In particular,  the results  indicate that 
shifts in  monetary policy  after  the founding of the Fed in 1914 led to  the 
elimination of predictable  temporary  movements,  including  seasonals,  in the 
nominal interest rate (on short-term  commercial  paper).  The results  identify 
the changes  in monetary  policy with specific changes  in the process  for 
monetary-base  growth.  Namely, the growth rate  became  non-stationary,  a 
substantially  negative moving-average  term appeared  (indicating  the tendency 
for reversals  In monetary growth),  and the seasonal patterns  changed.  The 
results suggest that it was not until the post-1954  period  that the Fed 
smoothed  the nominal  interest rate in  the sense of achieving  nearly 
random-walk  like behavior  in this rate. 
One interesting topic  for future  research  involves applying  the model  to 
other  countries.  At a  theoretical  level this  extension  raises  questions 
about the interplay between  the exchange-rate  regime  and the possibilities 
for independent  interest-rate  targeting  by individual central  banks.  One 
issue is why the elimination  of  predictable  short-run  movements  in  nominal 
interest rates  appeared  to  occur  simultaneously  around World  War I  in several 
industrialized  countries  (see Clark,  1986, and Mankiw, Miron  and Weil,  1986). 
The founding  of the Fed and the elimination of the classical  gold standard 
are possible  explanations  that  are worth exploring. 
The empirical  work  for the United  States  (or other  countries)  can be 
usefully  extended  to consider  in  more detail  the joint determination  of the 
nominal  interest rate, monetary  base, and the price  level.  Such  a joint 
treatment  would  allow testing of the model's detailed  predictions  about  the 
cross-relations  among the time-series  processes.  However,  these  predictions 35 
tend  to be  sensitive  to  parts of the specification—such  as the independence 
of the underlying  shocks—that  here not crucial for the results obtained  thus 
far.  Thus,  it will  probably  be  necessary  to make  the model  less restrictive 
in this respect.  'With these extensions,  it would be possible  to  estimate 
parameters,  such  as the interest-sensitivity  of money demand,  and the 
relative variances  of the different  disturbances. 36 
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Footnotes 
*This research  is supported  by  the National  Science Foundation.  I have 
benefited  from  comments  by 4arvin Goodfriend,  Bob King,  Greg  4ankiw. Allan 
Meltzer,  Ben McCallum,  and Bill Schwert. 
1Since  rn refers to  the monetary  base, the money-demand  shocks could  reflect 
shifts  in reserve requirements  or in other  financial  regulations.  In this 
broader sense,  monetary  policy can alter  the quantity  of real money demanded 
at a  given  nominal  interest rate.  But these kinds  of policies are not 
considered  here. 
2Lucas  (1984) views  the tax rate on money  as a determinant  of  the relative 
cost  of cash and credit goods.  Therefore,  if the tax rate  on  final output 
is set optimally,  it  is unclear that  the tax rate on money should be 
positive—that is, that  money-using goods  should  be  taxed  more heavily  than 
credit-  (or barter-)  using goods.  (For a similar argument,  see Kimbrough, 
1986.)  However, a positive  tax rate  on  money  does allow the government  to 
tax some  black-market  activities  where final  product is  not taxed.  Also,  if 
the main existing  taxes are on  some of the factor  inputs, especially  labor, 
then it may be  desirable  to  tax other inputs, such  as monetary  services. 
3Given  that  Pt is not observed  at date  t, it  is possible  that Pt should  be 
replaced  by Ep 
in equation  (1).  However,  in a setting such  as  Barro 
(1976), equation  (1) can arise as the aggregation  over local markets,  each of 
which observes  the current  local price, p(z). 41t would  be possible to assume  that the monetary authority  knows  but the 
private sector  does not.  However,  in the present model,  the equilibrium 
value for  would reveal  anyway. 
5Because  is observable  at date  t,  the lagged price  level,  turns 
out not to  enter  in  equation  (5). 
6Shiller  (1980, p. 130) recognizes  this possibility  but regards  it as 
implausible:  "he usually think that increasing high-powered  money  is, if 
anything,  a signal of higher  inflation.  It would  seem implausible, then, 
that these  lower  interest rates  are due to lower inflationary  expectations. 
It is conceivable  that exogenous  increases in the money stock  might  be a  sign 
of lower inflation over  a certain time  horizon  if the parameters  of our model 
were  just right."  In  the present model the  parameters  turn  out to  "just 
right" as a consequence of the monetary authority's  optimizing  behavior. 
use McCallum's  (1983, 1986) procedure  for selecting  the unique  bubble-free 
solution. 
8The  choice A3 
-+ m  seems  also  to  work.  However, A3 ￿  (1+)  can be ruled out 
on  grounds discussed  by McCallum  (1986, p.  140, n.7).  In  particular,  if 
A3 ￿ (1÷fl), then  the realization of a shock—say 17__causes  an unstable 
dynamic response  of  the price  level. 
9Results  for the nominal  interest rate are similar with  the 3-month  time loan 
rate used  by  Mankiw, Miron  and Weil  (1986). 43 
10 
The nominal  interest rate applies  to 4- to  6-month  commercial  paper 
(6-month paper  in recent years). as reported since  1890 in IJ.S.  Board  of 
Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and  Jionetary  StaJistics; 
Banking  and lonetary Statistics,  1941-1970:  1nnual Stalisttcal  Digest. 
1970-1979  and later issues; and the Federal Reserve  Bulletin.  Earlier data, 
from  4acaulay  (1938. Appendix Table  10), refer  to 60-90 day commercial  paper. 
(These were  adjusted  upward by .014 to merge with the other  series  in 1890.) 
The monetary  base since  1914 runes  from  the Federal  Reserve sources  noted 
above.  Earlier  data  come  from  the National  Bureau  of  Economic Research.  The 
CPI  since  1913 is  from  the Bureau  of  Labor Statistics  (CPI-IJ,  with the CPI 
less  shelter used  since  1970  to  avoid problems  with mortgage  interest costs). 
The PPI (all commodities)  since  1913 comes from  the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics.  Data from 1890 to 1912 are from  U.S. Department  of Labor,  1928 
(kindly provided  by Jeff  (iron).  Data before  1890 are from  'warren  and 
Pearson,  1933. Table  1. 
11For a discussion  of the Accord, see Friedman  and Schwartz,  1963, pp. 623ff. 
12Schwert  (1987b, Table  9) shows that  an  ARIMA  (0,1,4) process works  well on 
seasonally  adjusted  monthly data  for the growth  rate  of the monetary  base, 
CPI inflation,  and PPI  inflation. 
'3Weak evidence of seasonality  in  the nominal  interest rate  appears  in some 
sub-samples  of the post-1954  period—for example, for 1954.1-1959.4  and the 
1970s.  However,  the seasonals  look  very  different  for these two periods. 
The seasonal  found  for the 1954-  1959 period  seems to be  consistent  with  the 
results  of Diller  (1969, Ch. 3). t4Schwert's  (1987a, Table 3) Monte  Carlo results indicate that the 
Dickey-  Fuller  test for a unit root works well if the underlying  process  is 
ARIMA  (0,1,1).  Therefore  this  test  should be  appropriate  in the present 
context. 
15The estimated  residual standard  errors for inflation and monetary growth 
correspond  to  amd e  for equations  (22) and (19), respectively.  The 
corresponding  standard errors  for 
Ft 
and  are .028 and .042, respectively. 
These values  each  exceed  the residual standard error for the nominal  interest 
rate,  .012,  as  predicted  by  the theory. 
16 have made no  adjustment  here  for  the fact that the end-of-month  data 
before  August 1917  apply to  different days  of the week.  The finding of 
significant  seasonals  in monetary-base  growth  before 1914  accords  in a 
general way with  Kemmerer  (1910, Ch. 6), but seems to  conflict  with  results 
reported  by  Clark  (1986, pp. 106ff.). 
17Clark (1986, pp. 85ff.)  points  out that the main  seasonal  in nominal 
interest rates  ended at about  the same time—around 1914—in a number of 
industrialized  countries.  This  outcome accords with  the idea that  the ending 
of the gold standard freed  up  all the central banks  simultaneously.  However, 
it would be worthwhile  to  examine  the changes in  the monetary processes  for 
the various  countries.  Also,  it  is worth considering  whether  interest-rate 
targeting  by more  than  one country  is feasible under  fixed exchange  rates 
(even in the absence of a serious gold standard). T
a
b
l
e
 
I
h
e
g
r
e
s
s
I
o
n
 
e
s
o
1
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
5
4
1
-
1
9
8
7
-
4
P
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
,
,
C
S
i
S
2
5
3
S
4
 
t
-
 
M
A
(
1
)
M
A
(
2
)
M
A
(
3
)
M
.
A
(
4
)
Q
(
l
0
)
S
e
a
s
o
n
a
l
s
V
t
(
d
e
g
r
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
n
,
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
(
1
)
0
0
0
1
.
0
1
1
5
1
4
.
0
1
.
6
0
0
1
)
(
1
0
,
.
1
8
)
(
3
,
 
.
6
7
)
(
2
)
.
0
0
5
9
3
4
.
0
1
1
4
1
2
.
0
1
.
7
(
.
0
0
2
)
(
.
0
3
0
)
(
9
,
 
.
2
2
)
(
3
,
 
.
6
5
)
0
0
7
)
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
3
,
.
0
0
0
)
(
4
)
.
0
4
5
 
-
 
.
0
8
2
.
0
9
7
 
-
 
.
0
5
8
1
.
7
9
1
 
-
.
0
7
4
.
0
3
2
7
9
.
2
1
0
9
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
(
.
0
8
8
)
 
(
.
0
8
8
)
(
8
,
 
.
3
3
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
5
)
0
4
5
 
.
0
8
1
.
0
9
7
 
-
.
0
5
6
.
9
9
0
 
-
.
7
9
6
 
-
.
0
5
4
.
0
3
2
6
9
.
3
1
2
9
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
9
)
 
(
 
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
1
1
)
 
(
.
0
9
8
)
 
(
.
1
2
8
)
 
(
.
0
0
0
)
(
7
,
 
.
2
4
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
6
)
.
0
4
5
 
-
 
.
0
8
2
.
0
9
7
 
-
 
.
0
5
7
1
-
 
.
7
5
4
 
-
.
1
6
3
.
0
6
3
.
1
4
8
.
0
3
3
4
1
1
.
3
1
1
9
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
 
0
0
6
)
(
.
0
8
9
)
 
(
.
0
9
0
)
 
(
.
0
9
0
)
 
(
.
0
9
1
)
(
6
,
 
.
0
8
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
7
)
.
0
4
7
 
-
 
.
0
7
9
.
0
9
7
 
-
 
.
0
5
3
.
9
5
2
 
-
 
.
7
3
3
 
-
.
0
1
4
0
9
3
.
1
3
2
.
0
3
3
0
9
.
0
8
3
0
0
7
)
 
(
.
0
1
0
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
1
1
4
)
 
(
.
1
4
4
)
 
(
.
0
9
3
)
 
(
.
0
9
3
)
 
(
.
0
9
1
)
(
5
 
.
1
1
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
l
i
p
(
8
)
.
0
0
0
1
.
0
2
9
8
4
1
1
8
.
1
(
.
0
0
3
)
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
3
,
.
0
0
1
)
(
9
)
0
0
5
.
0
1
5
.
0
0
4
 
-
.
0
1
3
1
-
.
6
6
5
.
0
8
7
.
0
2
3
5
1
4
.
6
2
2
.
5
(
.
0
0
4
)
0
0
4
)
 
(
.
0
0
4
)
 
(
.
0
0
4
)
(
.
0
8
8
)
 
(
.
0
8
7
)
(
8
,
 
.
0
7
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
1
0
)
-
.
0
0
3
.
0
1
7
.
0
0
7
.
0
1
0
.
9
4
4
 
-
 
.
6
4
7
.
0
9
6
.
0
2
3
2
1
2
.
5
2
3
.
4
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
(
 
0
0
5
)
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
(
.
0
0
5
)
 
(
0
7
4
)
 
(
.
1
1
5
)
 
(
.
0
9
0
)
(
7
,
 
.
0
9
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
1
)
(
1
1
)
-
 
.
0
0
5
0
1
5
.
0
0
4
-
 
.
0
1
3
1
-
 
.
6
6
6
.
0
7
2
.
2
6
2
.
0
2
2
0
2
3
3
1
0
.
9
1
4
.
1
(
.
0
0
4
)
(
.
0
0
4
)
 
(
.
0
0
4
)
 
(
.
0
0
4
)
(
.
0
8
8
)
 
(
.
0
8
8
)
 
(
.
0
8
9
)
 
(
.
0
9
1
)
(
6
,
 
.
0
9
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
5
)
(
1
2
)
.
0
0
0
.
0
1
9
.
0
1
0
 
-
.
0
0
6
.
8
7
0
 
-
.
5
9
2
0
8
9
.
2
4
5
.
0
2
0
.
0
2
2
8
6
.
7
1
1
.
5
0
0
5
)
(
 
0
0
5
)
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
0
6
)
 
(
.
0
8
8
)
 
(
.
1
2
6
)
 
(
.
0
9
2
)
(
.
0
9
5
)
(
.
1
0
4
)
(
5
,
 
.
2
5
)
(
3
,
 
.
0
1
)
N
O
T
E
S
:
 
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
0
,
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
n
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
;
 
I
s
a
,
 
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
b
a
n
e
;
 
a
n
d
l
i
p
,
t
h
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
C
P
I
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
e
x
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
u
n
d
e
r
l
y
i
n
g
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
f
o
r
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
,
A
p
r
i
l
,
J
u
l
y
,
 
a
n
d
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
o
f
 
e
a
c
h
 
y
e
a
r
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
a
r
e
•
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
a
t
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
s
.
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
e
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
a
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
 
(
f
o
r
 
e
x
a
a
p
l
e
,
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
 
1
 
p
e
r
t
a
i
n
s
 
t
o
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
o
f
t
h
i
s
 
y
e
a
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
y
e
a
r
)
,
 
b
u
t
 
•
e
a
n
u
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
r
a
t
e
s
.
 
S
i
,
.
.
.
,
 
5
4
 
a
r
e
s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
s
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
u
r
 
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
s
.
 
è
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
e
r
r
o
r
 
o
f
 
e
s
t
i
.
a
t
e
.
 
q
(
l
o
)
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
Q
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
f
o
r
 
s
e
r
i
a
l
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
,
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
1
0
 
l
a
p
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
s
.
 
D
e
g
r
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
a
n
d
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
a
r
e
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
a
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
 
S
e
a
n
o
n
a
l
s
 
i
s
 
a
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
-
 
r
a
t
u
o
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
s
e
a
s
o
n
a
l
 
d
u
.
a
i
e
s
,
 
v
e
r
s
u
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
n
g
l
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
,
 
T
h
i
n
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
 
i
s
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
 
a
s
y
n
p
t
o
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
a
s
 
2
 
w
i
t
h
 
3
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
.
;
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
a
p
p
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.1
8
.
8
 
1
2
.
1
 
(
9
)
 
.
0
0
0
 
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
4
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
9
)
 
(
.
0
0
8
)
 
3
.
5
 
1
2
.
8
 
(
i
S
)
 
(
8
,
 
.
9
0
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
7
)
 
2
.
3
 
1
5
.
8
 
(
1
1
)
 
(
7
,
 
.
9
4
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
2
)
 
2
.
5
 
1
5
.
0
 
(
1
2
)
 
(
6
,
 
.
8
7
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
3
)
 
2
.
4
 
1
2
.
4
 
(
1
3
)
 
(
5
,
 
.
7
9
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
8
)
 
N
O
T
E
S
:
 
S
e
e
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
 
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
 
C
 
Y
t
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
a
o
n
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
2
2
.
1
-
1
9
4
0
.
4
 
S
i
 
S
2
 
S
3
 
$
4
 
Y
1
 
M
A
(
1
)
 
N
A
(
2
)
 
M
A
)
)
)
 
M
A
(
4
)
 
S
 
Q
(
1
0
)
 
S
e
s
e
o
n
a
l
.
 
(
d
e
g
r
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
s
,
.
i
g
n
l
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
 
9
 
(
1
)
 
—
.
0
0
0
7
 
1
 
.
0
0
4
7
 
1
6
.
6
 
6
.
0
 
(
.
0
0
0
5
)
 
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
9
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
1
2
)
 
(
2
)
 
—
.
0
0
1
4
 
(
.
0
0
1
0
)
 
.
0
0
0
1
 
(
.
0
0
1
0
)
 
—
.
0
0
2
4
 
(
.
0
0
1
0
)
 
.
0
0
0
9
 
(
.
0
0
1
0
)
 
1
 
.
2
3
5
 
(
.
1
1
9
)
 
.
0
0
4
5
 
1
0
.
7
 
(
9
.
 
.
3
0
)
 
5
.
7
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
4
)
 
(
3
)
 
.
0
0
0
1
 
(
.
0
0
1
4
)
 
.
0
0
1
6
 
(
.
0
0
1
3
)
 
—
.
0
0
1
0
 
(
.
0
0
1
3
)
 
.
0
0
2
2
 
(
.
0
0
1
3
)
 
.
9
4
9
 
(
.
0
2
9
)
 
.
7
5
9
 
(
.
1
2
3
)
 
.
0
0
4
5
 
9
.
1
 
(
8
,
 
.
3
2
)
 
8
.
7
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
4
)
 
,
 
4
(
 
.
0
0
3
 
1
 
.
1
3
4
6
 
2
1
.
3
 
1
9
.
4
 
(
.
0
1
5
)
 
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
2
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
 
(
5
)
 
.
0
9
0
 
(
.
0
2
2
)
 
.
0
1
1
 
(
.
0
2
2
)
 
.
0
7
5
 
(
.
0
2
2
)
 
.
0
3
9
 
(
.
0
2
2
)
 
1
 
—
.
6
5
9
 
(
.
1
2
2
)
 
—
.
2
7
6
 
(
.
1
2
2
)
 
.
0
9
5
7
 
1
0
.
4
 
(
B
,
 
.
2
5
)
 
1
6
.
4
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
1
)
 
(
6
)
 
—
.
0
8
6
 
—
.
0
1
0
 
.
0
7
6
 
.
0
4
5
 
.
9
4
6
 
—
.
7
4
0
 
—
.
1
2
5
 
.
0
9
5
9
 
1
0
.
1
 
2
3
 
(
7
)
 
(
.
0
3
8
)
 
—
.
0
0
1
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
—
.
0
1
1
 
(
.
0
2
2
)
 
.
0
7
6
 
(
.
0
3
2
)
 
.
0
4
0
 
(
.
2
5
0
)
 
1
 
(
.
2
8
2
)
 
—
.
5
7
6
 
(
.
1
3
2
)
 
—
.
2
1
6
 
.
0
4
3
 
—
.
1
8
3
 
.
0
9
8
6
 
(
7
,
 
.
1
9
)
 
1
3
.
2
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
 
9
.
6
 
(
9
)
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
—
.
0
6
1
 
(
.
0
4
7
)
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
—
.
0
0
5
 
(
.
0
2
5
)
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
.
0
7
9
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
(
.
0
2
3
)
 
.
0
6
3
 
(
.
0
3
9
)
 
.
7
5
4
 
(
.
3
4
3
)
 
(
.
1
2
5
)
 
—
.
4
9
1
 
(
.
3
7
0
)
 
(
.
1
2
7
)
 
—
.
0
8
8
 
(
.
1
5
3
)
 
(
.
1
2
7
)
 
.
1
3
4
 
(
.
1
3
0
)
 
(
.
1
2
8
)
 
—
.
0
8
5
 
(
.
1
4
7
)
 
.
0
9
8
6
 
(
6
,
 
.
0
4
)
 
1
3
.
9
 
(
5
,
 
.
0
2
)
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
2
)
 
8
.
7
 
(
3
,
 
.
0
4
)
 
.
 
.
 
0
6
6
9
 
—
.
0
3
6
 
.
0
0
7
 
.
0
3
4
 
.
0
0
1
 
1
 
—
.
6
4
0
 
.
1
3
6
 
.
0
5
3
6
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
1
2
0
)
 
(
.
1
2
0
)
 
—
.
0
3
5
 
—
.
0
0
2
 
.
0
2
7
 
.
0
0
1
 
.
7
4
5
 
—
.
5
0
9
 
.
1
8
8
 
.
0
5
0
6
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
4
)
 
(
.
0
1
3
)
 
(
.
0
3
2
)
 
(
.
7
0
2
)
 
(
.
2
3
3
)
 
(
.
1
2
9
)
 
—
.
0
3
7
 
.
0
0
6
 
.
0
3
3
 
—
.
0
0
1
 
1
 
—
.
6
5
8
 
.
1
0
5
 
.
0
3
0
 
—
.
2
2
9
 
.
0
5
3
1
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
1
2
1
)
 
(
.
1
2
2
)
 
(
.
1
2
2
)
 
(
.
1
2
2
)
 
—
.
0
3
5
 
—
.
0
0
2
 
.
0
2
7
 
.
0
0
1
 
.
7
4
9
 
—
.
4
9
4
 
.
1
6
7
 
.
0
9
6
 
—
.
1
4
5
 
.
0
5
1
3
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
0
1
9
)
 
(
.
0
1
7
)
 
(
.
0
1
2
)
 
(
.
4
4
3
)
 
(
.
4
5
8
)
 
(
.
1
6
7
)
 
(
.
1
9
9
)
 
(
.
2
0
1
)
 T
a
b
l
e
 
3
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
n
 
f
o
r
 
1
8
9
0
.
1
-
1
9
1
3
.
4
D
e
p
.
 
V
a
r
.
,
C
S
I
S
2
S
3
S
4
M
A
(
t
)
M
A
(
2
)
1
1
4
(
3
)
1
1
4
(
4
)
U
(
1
0
)
S
e
a
s
o
n
a
l
s
V
t
(
d
e
g
r
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
c
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
f
t
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
0
0
0
(
.
0
0
1
)
.
0
5
7
(
.
0
0
2
)
.
0
4
6
(
.
0
2
3
)
.
0
5
6
(
.
0
0
2
)
.
0
4
6
(
.
0
2
1
)
.
0
5
6
(
.
0
0
2
)
.
0
4
6
(
.
0
2
1
)
.
0
6
2
(
.
0
0
2
)
.
0
5
3
(
.
0
2
1
)
1
0
.
1
6
5
(
.
3
7
2
)
.
4
9
9
(
.
1
0
6
)
.
3
4
2
(
.
3
8
7
)
.
2
2
0
(
.
1
0
6
)
.
1
3
3
(
.
2
2
0
)
.
2
6
4
(
.
1
0
7
)
.
2
3
2
(
.
1
3
5
)
.
0
1
0
9
.
0
0
8
7
.
0
0
8
7
2
3
.
8
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
0
9
)
1
1
.
7
(
7
,
.
1
1
)
1
0
.
9
(
6
,
 
.
0
9
)
1
8
.
6
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
1
)
1
7
.
9
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
1
)
1
7
.
1
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
1
)
i
m
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
.
0
0
0
(
.
0
1
1
)
.
0
4
9
(
.
0
1
3
)
.
0
7
0
(
.
0
4
0
)
.
0
1
1
(
.
0
1
3
)
.
0
2
1
(
.
0
2
2
)
.
0
0
9
(
.
0
1
.
3
)
-
.
0
0
7
(
.
0
1
4
)
.
1
0
4
(
.
0
1
3
)
.
1
0
2
(
.
0
1
4
)
1
0
.
2
0
6
*
(
.
3
6
4
)
.
2
7
9
(
.
1
0
5
)
.
4
9
1
(
.
3
7
9
)
.
1
0
5
9
.
0
6
5
8
.
0
6
6
0
4
2
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
7
.
2
(
9
,
 
.
6
2
)
6
.
6
(
8
,
.
5
8
)
4
9
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
3
9
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
3
9
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
(
P
P
I
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
.
0
0
0
(
.
0
1
6
)
-
 
.
0
3
8
(
.
0
2
3
)
.
0
0
4
(
.
0
2
2
)
.
0
2
4
(
.
0
2
2
)
.
0
8
8
(
.
0
2
2
)
1
.
2
2
9
*
(
.
0
9
7
)
-
 
.
3
4
9
(
.
1
0
6
)
.
1
6
0
.
1
0
6
2
7
(
1
0
,
 
.
0
0
5
)
7
.
2
(
8
,
.
5
2
)
2
5
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
2
6
(
3
,
 
.
0
0
0
)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
1
.
0
 
a
t
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
.
0
5
 
l
e
v
e
l
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
D
i
c
k
e
y
-
 
F
u
l
l
e
r
 
t
e
s
t
 
(
F
u
l
l
e
r
,
 
1
9
7
6
,
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
8
.
5
.
2
,
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
N
O
T
E
S
:
 
P
P
I
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
,
 
S
e
e
T
a
b
l
e
I
 
f
o
r
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
n
o
t
e
s
.0
.
2
0
 
0
 
I
N
T
E
R
E
S
T
 
R
A
T
E
 
O
N
 
C
O
M
M
E
R
C
I
A
L
 
P
A
P
E
R
,
 
1
8
6
0
—
1
9
8
7
 
0
 
0
.
1
0
 
0
.
0
5
 
F
I
G
U
R
E
 
1
 0
.
5
0
—
0
.
5
0
G
R
O
W
T
H
 
R
A
T
E
 
O
F
 
M
O
N
E
T
A
R
Y
 
B
A
S
E
,
 
1
8
7
9
—
1
9
8
7
0
.
0
0
—
0
.
2
5
F
I
G
U
R
E
 
2I
N
F
L
A
T
I
O
N
 
R
A
T
E
 
(
c
R
1
)
,
 
1
9
1
3
—
1
9
8
7
 
0
.
3
 
0
2
 
0
 
—
o
d
 
—
0
2
 
1
9
2
0
 
F
I
G
U
R
E
 
3
 L
U
0
.
0
1
.
0
F
I
G
U
R
E
 
4
I
N
F
L
A
T
I
O
N
 
R
A
T
E
 
(
P
P
I
)
,
 
1
8
6
0
—
1
9
8
7
0
.
5
—
0
.
5
6
0
 
7
0
 
8
0
 
9
0
 
0
0
1
0
2
0
 
3
0
 
4
0
 
5
0
 
6
0
 
7
0
 
8
0